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INTRODUCTION

A Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) is a patent that must be
practiced by any firm wishing to commercially deploy a privatelyadopted standard, such as the standards promulgated by the European
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Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”). 1 The adoption of a
standard by a major Standard Setting Organization (“SSO”) 2—such as
ETSI—requires a declaration by a covered SEP-holder that effects a
legal commitment to license that the SEP on a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis (“FRAND”). 3 This gesture—which I describe as a
“FRAND ceremony”—has multiple legal consequences. The FRAND
ceremony binds the SEP-holding declarant to the express terms of the
commitment as a matter of private law (which, in regard to ETSI, is a
matter of French law). Moreover, the FRAND ceremony establishes
additional obligations binding on the SEP-holder—sourced in EU
competition law. The declarant acknowledges the “essentiality” of its
patent to the practice of the standard, which goes a long way to
presumptively establishing a “dominant position” under Article 102 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 4 and
charging the SEP-holder with “special responsibility.” The holder of a
SEP incorporated in an ETSI standard (or a standard of most other
important SSOs) is thus likely bound to make available licenses on
FRAND (or FRAND-like) terms that overlay or augment the FRAND
undertaking expressly set out in the FRAND declaration itself.
This Essay examines the FRAND formulation for determining the
maximum royalties payable to the holder of a Standard Essential
Patent, with a focus on EU competition law. The holder undertaking to
license a SEP on FRAND terms undoubtedly makes a contractual
commitment. Moreover, the SEP holder affects a change in legal status,
engaging Article 102 TFEU. There are two related and overlapping sets
of FRAND obligations now in play: one established by private law
according to express terms defined by the SEP-holder and the SSO; the
other flowing from EU competition law.
There is hardly any point where competition law and intellectual
property rights collide more directly than in the case of Standard
1. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ESTI”) is the pre-eminent
standard-setting organization for telecommunications standards. ETSI participated in the setting
of the 3G and 4G/LTE standards, which were the subject of the Smartphone Wars. ETSI’s
FRAND processes are subject of the Huawei and Unwired Planet cases, discussed in this Essay.
2. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
3. For the current version of ETSI’s FRAND obligation, see EUROPEAN TELECOMMS.
STANDARDS INST. § 6, annex 6 (2018).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter Article 102 TFEU].
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Essential Patents. A SEP, like any patent, enjoys a presumption of
validity and gives its holder a set of commercial exclusivities. These
exclusivities may operate to generate an economic reward to an
innovator. A SEP, like any patent, may generate monopoly rents
reflective of the market power of the covered invention. 5 Indeed, SEPs
are more likely to enjoy significant market power than ordinary patents,
for reasons to be discussed below, and as such are more likely—in the
words of Article 102 TFEU—to constitute a “dominant position.” 6
The incorporation of a patent into a widely utilized standard will
significantly enhance that patent’s market power. Rival technologies,
that would otherwise check the SEP’s power in the market, fall away
into competitive irrelevance once the standard is set. A SEP “locks in”
all users of the standard; they may not avoid practicing the SEP if they
wish to deploy the associated standard. A SEP holder may “hold up”
any prospective practitioner of the standard; the amount of royalties the
SEP holder might then demand will reflect more than the simple value
of the innovation covered by the patent. The SEP holder can
expropriate, at least in theory, a considerable amount of the value of
the standard itself (which necessarily exceeds the value of the
innovation subject to the patent).
SSOs have long recognized this vulnerability to opportunistic
demands by SEP holders. Most significant standard setting exercises—
such as the 3G and 4G/LTE standards established by ETSI—now
condition the incorporation of a patented technology into an adopted
standard on the making of a FRAND commitment by the patent
holder. 7 The FRAND undertaking typically binds the SEP holder to
license its SEP to anyone desiring to practice the standard. 8 Moreover,
any license of the SEP must be on a “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” basis. 9
5. Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013).
6. Article 102 TFEU.
7. See Jeffrey Lewis, What is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential to
an Accepted Standard, CARDOZO 2-3 (Jun. 11, 2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/
sites/default/files/Lewis.WhatIsFrandAllAbout.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8Y7-C4ZM].
8. Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not Be Set by
the Courts, 15 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19, 20 (2016).
9. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 45 (2015).
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Within Europe, the legal obligation binding a SEP-holder to
license the SEP on a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis has
twin sources. The first source is easily recognized. A FRAND
obligation is voluntarily “declared” by the holder of an SEP during the
standard setting exercise. The SSO sponsoring the adoption of the
relevant standard will define—in its rules—the terms of the FRAND
obligation; the SEP declarant essentially checks a box electing
FRAND. The SEP holder’s FRAND declaration establishes valid legal
obligations under contract or related theories. From this viewpoint, the
FRAND obligation is an artifact of private law, and private law will
largely determine the nature of the scope of the particular FRAND
obligation. The engagement of FRAND results from the exercise of the
SEP-holder’s election; in the absence of the FRAND declaration, the
SEP-holder would be unbound with regard to its patent licensing
practices. EU courts and the European Commission recognize the
presence of the SEP-holder’s FRAND declaration in giving rise to the
legal obligations that attach to the SEP; they presume the declaration is
essential to the application of FRAND to the SEP.
The second source of the FRAND obligation is competition law.
The concept of FRAND, as a response to an exploitative exercise of a
property right, was first developed in competition law cases in the
United States10 and the European Union. 11 Competition law courts
applied remedies featuring mandates to concede access to “essential
facilities” to competitors or others on a FRAND basis. 12 While US
antitrust law has largely retreated from recognition of the essential
facilities doctrine, 13 the doctrine is alive and well under Article 102
TFEU. Operation of the Intellectual Property (“IP”)-related “essential
facilities doctrine” under Article 102 TFEU may justify the imposition
of remedies that resemble FRAND regardless of the presence or
10. The “essential facilities doctrine” in US antitrust law is traced to United States v.
Terminal Railroad Assoc. of St. Louis. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985).
11. Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission of
European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
12. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities
Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 446 (2002); see also Marina Lao,
Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
275, 287 (2013).
13. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004);
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
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absence of a FRAND declaration by the intellectual property rights
holder. That is, EU competition law may provide an independent
ground for imposing a FRAND obligation on the holder of a SEP or
other piece of IP that fits within the EU essential facilities doctrinal
developments tracing from Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the
European Communities (“Magill”). 14
A reconciliation of these two views—one private law, the other
public law in nature—can be achieved by cumulating their respective
legal effects. In most SEP-licensing cases involving a FRAND
declaration, the consent-based, private law source coexists with
autonomous, public law obligations rooted in EU competition law. The
making of a FRAND declaration has more than contractual effects. It
also effects a change in legal status that directly engages Article 102
TFEU and is independent—in terms and scope—from any FRAND
specification explicitly made by the SEP owner or imposed by a
Standard Setting Organization. The FRAND obligation sourced in
Article 102 TFEU is paramount—and, where recognized, operates
without regard to the presence of a potentially narrower FRAND
obligation generated within the standard setting exercise. This twinsource approach can be squared with the understandings reflected in
the Article 102 TFEU cases treating FRAND obligations, 15 as well as
in the November 2017 Commission notice on a common approach to
SEPs. 16
II. THE FRAND OBLIGATION ARISES THROUGH A
CONTRACTUAL DECLARATION
A FRAND undertaking in the standard setting context can be
viewed as a voluntary commitment, governed by the private law.
Indeed, this is the conventional understanding. The holder of a patent
competing for inclusion in a standard engages itself to make licenses
14. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indep.
Television Publ’ns Ltd (ITP) v Comm’n of the European Communities, 1995 E.C.R. I-743
[hereinafter Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P].
15. See, e.g., Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v ZTE Corp.,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477,
available
at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0170 [https://perma.cc/59VF-J2TE]; Unwired
Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344.
16. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee:
Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, COM (2017) 712 Final (November
2017).
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available for practice of that patent to all interested licensees on
FRAND terms—including firms that had not participated in the
standard setting exercise. There is something of a contractual quid pro
quo in this process: the holder of what will become a SEP anticipates a
broad and perhaps industry-wide deployment of its invention. The
invention will likely enjoy a considerable market share and will likely
endure longer upon adoption by the SSO as a standard; both of these
expectations will likely lead to an increase in the revenues that will be
generated by the SEP during its term, even when license royalties are
limited by a FRAND commitment. The SSO incorporating the patent
into a standard will assure its members (as well as others outside the
SSO) access to a superior technology (as of the time of the adoption of
the standard) on reliable commercial terms.
The Commission in its November 2017 notice understands the
engagement of a FRAND-based licensing obligation to result once “the
holders of the SEPs have given a commitment to license them on
(FRAND) terms. . . .” 17 The FRAND declaration by the patent owner
operates to create the legal obligation to license on FRAND terms. The
Commission Notice, for the most part, takes a private law view as to
the source of a binding FRAND commitment.
In Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., the Court of
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) describes the FRAND
undertaking made by Huawei, the SEP holder in that case, to ETSI, the
relevant SSO, as binding. 18 The Court points out that Clause 8.1 of
Annex 6 of ETSI’s Rules of Procedure addresses the case where an
owner of patent rights refuses to give a FRAND undertaking, making
clear that a FRAND commitment represents an unconstrained exercise
of the patent owner’s discretion. 19 While Huawei arises under the
specific circumstances of the Long Term Evolution standard setting
process conducted by ETSI 20, the essential contractual nature of a
FRAND commitment, in the eyes of the Court of Justice, is likely a
general case.
A contract vision of the FRAND undertaking dominates the
court’s analysis in Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd.. The UK High Court (per Justice Birss)
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1.
C-170/13, Huawei ¶¶ 74-76.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-20.
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describes three “relevant legal contexts” for the consideration of
FRAND: “(1) compliance with the FRAND commitment as a matter of
contract, (2) compliance with competition law and (3) the grant or
refusal of injunctions.” 21 Justice Birss’ concern in Unwired Planet is
largely on FRAND as a matter of contract. He notes that both the ETSI
intellectual property rights policy and the form of the FRAND
declaration provide that the “construction, validity and performance”
of the FRAND undertaking is governed by French law. 22 The High
Court in Unwired Planet considers various alternative foundations
under French law—contract or enforceable stipulation or unilateral
commitment—as to the legal basis for the FRAND commitment and
concludes that under any of these theories, the FRAND declaration
creates an enforceable obligation. 23
The pure contract view is seriously misleading. Public law in
various forms—including patent and competition law—are
unavoidably part of the FRAND landscape. These bodies of law shape
the content of the FRAND undertaking and operate as distinct sources
of limits and bounds on SEP royalty terms. Justice Birss does recognize
that EU competition law can apply to FRAND commitments 24—but in
his judgment in Unwired Planet it is unclear as to how (and why)
Article 102 TFEU is engaged.
It is easy then to assume that the FRAND undertaking is a creature
of private law, an ordering that is determined within the zone of
contractual freedom. This view has been coupled with the further
assertion that public law should not interfere with the free functioning
of FRAND commitments. 25 An exclusion of public law scrutiny might
arguably represent wise policy. That said, there is little foundation to
the claim, at least with regard to EU competition law, that private actors
can, by interposing a set of arrangements, construct a “do not enter”
zone into which public law may not penetrate.

21. Unwired Planet Int’l v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) [99] (Eng.).
22. See id. at ¶ 100.
23. See id. at ¶ 139.
24. See id. at ¶¶ 147-57.
25. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, The Troubling
Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2 (2015).
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III. A FRAND OBLIGATION IS ANCHORED IN EU
COMPETITION LAW
Article 102 TFEU operates as an independent source, which
imposes duties on a holder of a SEP to license that patent on FRAND
terms to any undertaking desiring to practice the relevant standard.
Many SEP holders enter into commitments to license their SEPs on
FRAND terms as part of the standard setting exercise, 26 but the entry
of these private commitments masks the public obligations imposed by
EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU is, under many conditions
involving the licensing of a SEP, a sufficient and independent basis to
generate a FRAND obligation. That is, the refusal to license a SEP to a
party wishing to practice a standard will constitute an abuse of a
dominant position. Moreover, a SEP holder demanding royalties that
exceed FRAND levels (whatever they may be) may also violate Article
102 TFEU. 27 A SEP likely will constitute a dominant position in the
narrow technology market covered by the patent’s scope. The SEP may
also hold a dominant position in the broader market defined by the
standard that has incorporated the patent. A SEP may be an “essential
facility,” falling within the well-established reach of Article 102
TFEU. 28 That is, Article 102 TFEU imposes a duty on the SEP
holder—even in the absence of a FRAND undertaking—to license to
SEP on FRAND terms.
In certain circumstances, European competition law imposes a
duty to license on an owner of intellectual property. In Radio Telefis
Eireann v. Commission (Magill), 29 the CJEU upheld a Commission
decision imposing a copyright licensing obligation on a group of Irish
broadcasters. Magill made clear under European competition law that
in special circumstances 30 an IP-holder has a duty to license, 31 and that
license must be on a nondiscriminatory basis. It found three television
broadcasters operating in Ireland to have violated the predecessor to
Article 102 TFEU in refusing to license IP-protected material that was
26. See supra note 7, at 3.
27. See Roberto Grasso, Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust
Perspectives, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR 80 (Ashish Bharadwaj
et al. eds., 2018).
28. See Pitofsky supra, note 12; Lao, supra, note 12.
29. Joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, supra note 14.
30. See id. at ¶ 52.
31. Id. at ¶ 91.
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“indispensable” to the development of a new product. 32 Magill
involved copyright 33, not patent, and the reach of Irish copyright as a
matter of law seems rather extravagant (in that it was found to protect
program listing data).
Magill’s specification of the conditions where a duty to license
arises lies at the heart of the case. The refusal to license a copyright in
these circumstances constitutes the violation of TFEU 102—an
actionable abuse of a dominant position. A FRAND-like licensing
obligation is the remedy for this violation. In Magill, the broadcasters
were refusing to provide detailed program listings for a publisher
seeking to introduce a comprehensive and comparative weekly
television guide. The broadcasters attempted to justify their refusal by
invoking their exclusive rights established by national copyright law. 34
The broadcasters were found to enjoy a dominant position in the market
for dedicated guides to their own programming. 35 In this context, they
could not block the appearance of a new product (a comparative
television guide) that would compete with their existing products. The
information encased in the copyrighted program guides published by
the broadcasters were essential to the production of a comparative
television guide. Magill is seen as established an IP-oriented “essential
facilities doctrine” in EU competition law.
The Commission, in its decision, had ordered the broadcasters to
make available by license their copyrighted advance program listings
“on a non-discriminatory basis.” 36 The imposed remedy does not
include much guidance on what is intended by its non-discrimination
obligation. Each broadcaster is expressly a beneficiary of the decision,
in that it is assured access to the advanced program listings of the
others; the Commission-imposed duty-to-license extends to
competitors in the broadcast space as well as any publishing firm
considering production of a comparative television guide. 37
The more recent and more telling story of Article 102-based dutyto-license is found in the Microsoft Corp. v. Commission 38 decided by
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
II-1491.

Id. at ¶ 53.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 47.
Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 89/205/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 78) ¶ 27.
Id.
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n of the European Communities, 2007 E.C.R
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the General Court. Microsoft is premised on the presence of de facto
standard constructed around Microsoft’s Windows operating system. 39
Microsoft builds upon Magill and its progeny, and it demonstrates the
EU’s insistence that an IP-license must be offered on a
nondiscriminatory basis in situations involving significant competition
law concerns. 40 The General Court in Microsoft upheld the
Commission’s finding that Microsoft had violated Article 102 TFEU
by refusing to license “interoperability information” (which was
covered, in part, by copyright) to its rivals in the Windows work group
server market. 41
The General Court also upheld the Commission’s finding that
access to Microsoft’s interoperability information by Sun and other
competitors was “indispensable” for carrying out the development and
marketing of work group servers networking Windows-operating
computers, satisfying the first Magill factor. 42 The General Court
further upheld the Commission’s finding that Microsoft’s refusal to
provide the copyrighted interoperability information would tend to
exclude all competition in the market for work group server operating
systems. 43
The General Court then evaluated the third “exceptional
circumstances” factor established in Magill: whether Microsoft’s
conduct prevented the appearance of a new product. 44 Article 102(b) of
the TFEU is given as the source norm generating the circumstances
where a refusal to deal may constitute an abuse of a dominant position
(where the conduct is found to be “limiting production, markets or
technical development to the prejudice of consumers”). The General
Court significantly expanded the situations where there may be Article
102 liability for refusal to license from the neatly cabined “new
product” test set out in Magill:
The circumstances relating to the appearance of a new product, as
envisaged in Magill and IMS Health . . . cannot be the only
parameters which determines whether a refusal to license an
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at ¶ 32.
See id. at ¶¶ 807-11.
Id. at ¶ 103.
Id. at ¶ 436.
Id. at ¶ 593.
Id. at ¶ 643-49.
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intellectual property right is capable of causing prejudice to
consumers within the meaning of [Article 102(b) TFEU]. As that
provision states, such prejudice may arise where there is a
limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical
development. 45

The “new product” factor found in Magill and IMS Health
constituted an Article 102(b) limitation of production or markets;
Microsoft’s refusal to deal was determined to work a limitation of
technical development, satisfying Article 102(b) in an unprecedented
way. 46 Microsoft thus demonstrates that the refusal to license category
of abusive conduct has been enlarged—and is perhaps capable of
further enlargement. The General Court also made clear that
consideration of Microsoft’s intellectual property rights did not
constitute a justification for what was found to be actionable abusive
conduct. 47
The Microsoft case ended with a set of remedies imposed by the
Commission, including a compulsory license for Microsoft’s
interoperability information on “reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms.” 48 That is, a non-consensual FRAND-like obligation was
imposed on Microsoft as a remedy for its Article 102 violation. Further
proceedings examined whether Microsoft’s licenses properly
implemented the Commission’s decision and whether the royalties
charged by Microsoft were excessive. 49 This led to a further challenge
before the General Court. 50 Microsoft is currently charging a flat
US$10,000 upfront royalty and a 0.4% running royalty in the Patent
License Agreement available under the Microsoft Interoperability
Program (“MIP”) implemented pursuant to the Interoperability
45. Id. at ¶ 647.
46. See id.
47. Id. at ¶¶ 689-91.
48. See the discussion of the Commission remedies, including the compulsory license of
interoperability information in Nicholas Economides and Ioannis Lianos, The quest for
appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases: a comparataive appraisal, in Luca Rubini (ed.),
Microsoft on Trial: Legal and Economic Analysis of a Transatlantic Antitrust Case.
49. Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=08FC5E681DA625
D3931574DB4145507F?text=&docid=124434&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=2398685 [https://perma.cc/P7B8-S7BE].
50. Id.
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Undertaking entered into by Microsoft and the Commission on
December 16, 2009. 51
Microsoft shows the remedial character both in the main
proceedings and in the subsequent challenges to Microsoft’s
compliance with the initial remedial order. Microsoft remains one of
the most important investigations brought by the Commission for
abuses of a dominant position. Access to a SEP in order to practice a
standard share some of the “exceptional” context found in Magill. A
standard may or may not enable a “new product,” but the General Court
seems to have relaxed the “new product” factor in Microsoft.
IV. THE FRAND CEREMONY ENGAGES ARTICLE 102 TFEU
A.

The Coexistece of EU Competition Law FRAND and Private Law
FRAND

If the imposition of FRAND could be viewed as the result of a
contractual undertaking, it would follow that the contracting parties
(which includes the SEP holder) would ultimately determine the nature
and effects of that undertaking. A court examining the actions of a SEP
holder with regard to a FRAND-committed patent will seek in principle
to divine the drafting parties’ intentions in interpreting the scope of the
FRAND commitment. 52 The parties could condition the FRAND
obligation; they might subject, for example, an extension of a FRAND
license of the SEP to a reciprocating FRAND offer to access
technology controlled by the potential licensee. Or the parties might
limit the benefit of the FRAND commitment to certain parties; they
might restrict FRAND terms to participating members of the SSO
sponsoring the relevant standard. If FRAND is essentially contractual
in nature, the parties could exercise wide latitude under general notions
of freedom of contract (or analogous private law doctrines found in
national law).
This posture changes dramatically if the FRAND obligation arises
from Article 102 TFEU. In this case, specifying the scope and effects
of the FRAND obligation becomes a matter of judicial prerogative
(given that Article 102 forms part of the TFEU, the highest order of EU
51. See European Commission Press Release IP/07/1567, Antitrust: Commission ensures
compliance with 2004 Decision against Microsoft (Oct. 22, 2007); see also Economides &
Lianos, supra note 48, at 423-24.
52. See, e.g., Unwired Planet Int’l, [2017] EWHC 711, supra note 21, ¶ 783.
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law). If Article 102 TFEU generates an obligation on the SEP holder to
license on FRAND terms, it is for the EU judiciary to define that
obligation. The intent or understanding of the parties participating in
the standard setting exercise—including that of the SEP holder—are of
little importance. They certainly do not have the power to restrict,
condition or otherwise limit the scope of any FRAND duty arising
under Article 102 TFEU.
In many situations, the FRAND obligation assumed by contract
will co-exist alongside a FRAND (or perhaps FRAND-like) set of
“special responsibility” duties imposed by EU competition law. Article
102 TFEU is mandatory law, of course, and a firm cannot escape the
reach of Article 102 by the expedient of a unilateral declaration. Article
102 FRAND constitutes a minimum obligation; the contract form of
FRAND stipulated within the standard setting exercise can only
increase the obligation sourced in competition law; it cannot relax it.
In Unwired Planet, Justice Birss seems to understand co-existence
along these lines. In his discussion of the “fair and reasonable” element
in FRAND, he finds that a contract-sourced FRAND obligation
provides for a lower single FRAND price that falls below the
“excessive pricing” zone set by Article 102 TFEU. 53 In his view, the
ETSI-specified form of FRAND imposes a more severe restriction of
the royalty rate that can be demanded by the SEP-holder than the
avoidance of excessive pricing imposed by Article 102 TFEU. 54 He
may or may not be correct as to where an ETSI declarant’s royalty must
be set in comparison to the maximum royalty rate permitted by
competition law. Regardless, Justice Birss makes explicit that the
private law obligation to charge no greater than FRAND royalties coexists with royalty limits resulting from the special responsibility owed
by the SEP-holder imposed by Article 102 TFEU.
B.

A Change in Status Links EU Competition Law FRAND to
Private Law FRAND

Article 102 TFEU is present in both Huawei and Unwired Planet,
but neither the Court of Justice in Huawei nor the High Court in
Unwired Planet give much attention to how Article 102 TFEU is
engaged. Perhaps Article 102 attaches according to its own principles

53. Id. at ¶ 153.
54. Id.
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in these cases. That is, each case involves the possession of a dominant
position and behavior that satisfies the Article 102 notion of abuse.
In Huawei, an Article 267 TFEU referral to the CJEU from the
Landgericht Düsseldorf, the referring court stipulates that the existence
of Huawei’s dominant position “is not in dispute” in the national
proceedings. 55 The CJEU addresses an asserted Article 102 TFEU
abuse of that dominant position involving Huawei’s bringing of an
action for a prohibitory injunction, based on the unauthorized practice
by ZTE of Huawei’s SEP. 56 The CJEU describes the steps by which
Huawei notified its patent 57 to ESTI, and Huawei’s simultaneous
undertaking to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND terms. 58 One
may infer then that it is this undertaking—and ETSI’s subsequent
incorporation of Huawei’s into ETSI’s Long Term Evolution
standard—that establishes Huawei’s dominant position from which
Article 102 TFEU exposure flows.
It would be helpful to view the engagement of Article 102 TFEU
as flowing automatically from the making of a FRAND declaration
within the standard setting exercise. The imposition of Article 102
“special responsibility”—duties to avoid abusive conduct—results
from the SEP-holder’s undertaking. That is, a FRAND declaration has
legal consequences beyond the mere establishment of contractual
obligations. A FRAND declaration constitutes a shift in legal status—
transforming an ordinary patent to one invested with standard
essentiality—that calls Article 102 TFEU into play.
A FRAND declaration accompanies an assertion by the holder of
a candidate SEP that the concerned patent is essential to the practice of
the standard. This is largely a unilateral act; SSOs, at least initially, do
not verify these assertions of essentiality. 59 The FRAND commitment
“ceremony” is better described as involving both the assertion of
essentiality of the SEP and the assumption of the obligation to license
55. See, e.g., Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies, supra note 15.
56. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies, supra note 15.
57. Huawei’s patent is identified as EP 2 090 050 B 1, bearing the title “Method and
apparatus of establishing a synchronization signal in a communications system.” Case C-170/13,
Huawei Technologies, supra note 15.
58. The relevant ‘FRAND ceremony’ occurred on March 4, 2009. Case C-170/13, Huawei
Technologies, supra note 15.
59. See How To Check The Essentiality Of A Standard Essential Patent, GREYB (Jun. 26,
2018), https://www.greyb.com/checking-essentiality-sep/ [https://perma.cc/J9Q2-W6SN]. See
also CYBER CREATIVE INDUSTRIES CO., EVALUATION OF LTE ESSENTIAL PATENTS DECLARED
TO ETSI 16 (Jun. 2013).
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the SEP on FRAND terms. The FRAND commitment ceremony
presumptively satisfies the tests proposed by Magill and Microsoft. The
elements that must be established in order to demonstrate a refusal to
license IP as an abuse are (1) access to the IP is indispensable in order
to access a market, (2) the refusal to provide access would exclude all
competition and (3) “exceptional circumstances.”
Indispensability is a primary element in the finding of an Article
102 TFEU violation for failure to license the holder’s intellectual
property. Whether an asserted SEP is indeed essential to the practice of
a standard requires a complex factual assessment, but the owner is
likely to have knowledge in its possession as to whether this test is
satisfied. Moreover, the mere assertion of essentiality within the
FRAND commitment ceremony should be sufficient, at a minimum, to
raise a presumption of indispensability to satisfy the test set out in
Magill and Microsoft.
Many if not most standards involving a complex of technologies
will occupy a competitive field. The Windows standard developed by
Microsoft was the result of a mix of technological prowess, aggressive
business practices and good luck. There was no significant market for
work group servers that did not involve Windows. Similarly, the 3G
and LTE standards promulgated by ETSI (which were the subject of
the Huawei and Unwired Planet cases) completely dominated global
telecommunications market. A patent that is essential for
commercialization within a standardized market will satisfy the second
factor.
Recall that Microsoft relaxed the demand in Magill that the refusal
to license prevent the appearance of a new product. Microsoft was
supplying the market of interest (Windows interoperable work group
server software) that its rivals wished to enter. Yet Microsoft’s refusal
to license the copyrights Windows interoperability information was
found to be “limiting production, markets or technical developments to
the . . . prejudice of consumers.” 60 A SEP holder who would refuse to
license its SEP to a party wishing to practice the related standard would
have an analogous effect. Together, the FRAND commitment
ceremony – marked by both the declaration of standard essentiality and
the FRAND commitment – provide a basis to directly engage Article
102 TFEU, exposing the SEP-holder to competition law liability for

60. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., supra note 38, at ¶ 643.
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any failure to license the SEP on FRAND terms defined by competition
law.
V. CONCLUSION
Standard-essential patents attract FRAND-like discipline, at least
as a matter of European competition law, beyond the private law
obligations assumed by their holders. This compounds the dilemma of
multiple, and perhaps conflicting, tests applied to any particular SEP
license. In addition to the prospect of different national courts applying
inconsistent national tests as to whether a particular set of terms is or is
not FRAND, there is the further possibility of difference between the
FRAND elements autonomously imposed by public law (such as EU
competition law) and similar obligations resulting from the operation
of a private law undertaking.
Magill suggests the FRAND commitment should not be
considered as merely a private, contractual undertaking. Public law,
such as EU competition law, may independently impose a duty of
license a SEP on FRAND terms. If FRAND is, even in part if not in
parallel, a public obligation, then it is more likely to convey public
concerns. What then are the public concerns conveyed by Magill? The
first is the appearance of a new product. This might stretch a FRAND
obligation forward into new technologies that lie beyond the standard
as currently practiced. Second, access to the patent must be
indispensable. This opens an inquiry as to whether “essential” as
understood in a private standard setting is the same as “indispensable”
within the meaning of Magill. Magill establishes that “essential
facilities” arguments with regard to intellectual property may sound in
particular circumstances under Article 102 TFEU and that a remedial
award should have FRAND-like characteristics.
The FRAND ceremony provides a bright line marking the taking
on of special responsibility under Article 102 TFEU. The making of a
FRAND declaration constitutes a profound change in the legal status
of a patent, as it transforms from mere patent to SEP and accretes
greater market power. The FRAND ceremony’s transformational effect
is premised on the patent’s essentiality (or indispensability) for the
practice of a standard that will have substantial market power. Within
the technology market corresponding to each SEP, the SEP-holder
holds a “dominant position.” FRAND or FRAND-like duties attach to
the SEP that co-exist—and may exceed—the explicit FRAND
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commitment contained in the declaration that underlies the FRAND
ceremony.
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